• Anna Loukianova Graduate School of Management, Saint Petersburg University
  • Egor Nikulin Graduate School of Management, Saint Petersburg University
  • Alexander Kanivetc Graduate School of Management, Saint Petersburg University
Keywords: offshore, deoffshorization, deoffshorization policy, company valuation


This paper investigates the impact of deoffshorization on the market value of Russian companies. The methodology of event study was used. Three events were analyzed, including the announcement of intentions to leave offshores from several major companies and the introduction of anti-offshore legislation (December 2013 - March 2014). We have not revealed any mutually significant market response to the selected events, since some of the firms faced positive cumulative abnormal returns, while the others encountered negative ones. At the same time, an empirical study showed evidence of significant negative effect on the market value for several companies. It can be argued that the deoffshorization impact on companies depends to a large extent on the offshore structure they use. Companies that are significantly exposed to deoffshorization need to adjust their strategy in order to counter potential negative consequences of this process


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