Ivan Sarmány-Schuller, Adriana Kiššová


The aim of the research was to find out the preferred decision in an economic game. Our sample comprised 433 participants (students of humanities and economics/engineering and customers of betting shops) who were administered this game twice. The wording for the second choice was changed according to two theorems based on this game (Samuelson and Rabin theorems). Our aim was to find out if there were differences in the choice of game between the groups of participants, and if uncertainty and change of wording was related to change in decision. Results show that the most preferred possibility in all three groups of participants was to not play any game. Participants did not make any changes to their decisions even in repeated choice when the wording was changed; they still adhered to their previous choice. Self-assessment of certainty and uncertainty proved significant only in the case of students of humanities (psychology and social work), where assessing the decision as uncertain led to its change. On the contrary, if a decision was assessed as certain, it was not subject to any change later. Students of humanities had significantly higher score of pathological certainty (C3) than other degrees of the Uncertainty-Certainty Scale, which is related to a higher willingness to play the offered games. 


decision making, loss aversion, risk aversion, Samuelson theorem, Rabin theorem, certainty and uncertainty

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12955/snsj.v9i1.717


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